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Risk Analysis  for Proprietors with
Limited Liability: A Mean-Variance,
Safety-First Synthesis
Robert A.  Collins  and Edward E. Gbur
Since nearly  the entire U.S.  output of agricultural commodities  is produced by
proprietors with limited liability,  it is important to understand how limited liability
affects decisions in a risky environment.  This article extends the work of Robison  and
Barry; Robison  and Lev; and Robison,  Barry,  and Burghardt.  It provides  a rigorous
derivation of one of their objective functions, compares  it to standard  risk analysis
tools, and suggests several  methods of empirical implementation.  Under some
conditions, utility maximization in the limited  liability environment is consistent with
optimization of Roy's safety-first criterion, while in other situations Freund's mean-
variance criterion  is appropriate.  However, it is easy to demonstrate  cases where
neither criterion  is applicable.
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Recently, long overdue attention has been giv-
en to the role of limited financial liability and
other economic institutions on decision mak-
ing  under uncertainty.  Contributions  by Ro-
bison  and Barry;  Robison and  Lev;  and Ro-
bison,  Barry,  and Burghardt have considered
several  realistic institutions  that may be  im-
portant  in explaining  decisions  under uncer-
tainty  by real-world  economic  agents.  All  of
these extensions of conventional theory divide
the domain of an economic outcome into two
sections  where  some  fundamental  difference
exists  when  the  outcome  is  above  or below
some  threshold  level.  The  most  general  and
omnipresent  of these institutions  is the limi-
tation of proprietary  liability.
This article extends and broadens their work
for the case of limited liability by showing how
their model with completely general utility and
density functions  may be empirically  applied
when  some assumptions  are  made  about the
functional  forms and shows  how their model
may  be  derived  from  alternative  sets of as-
sumptions.  A general first-order condition for
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maximizing  their  general  objective  function
also is shown, and guidance  is given on inter-
pretation  of model results.  These extensions
tie their work to the empirical methods of Yas-
sour, Zilberman,  and Rausser;  Collender and
Chalfant; Roy;  and Freund.
In the first section we establish the problem
setting,  show  the equivalence  of assuming  a
Masson-type  segmented  utility  function  or a
truncated density, and give a general first-or-
der condition.  Next we examine the problem
when utility is negative exponential and show
how this may lead to empirical  implementa-
tion of the Robison-Barry objective function.
The  third  section  of the  article  includes  the
analysis of the model with the traditional  as-
sumptions of exponential utility and a normal
distribution and a demonstration that the Ro-
bison-Barry model contains the Freund linear
mean-variance  criterion and  the Roy  safety-
first criterion as special  cases.
Expected Utility Maximizing  under
Limited Liability
Effective limitation of proprietary liability has
been an important American  economic insti-
tution for more than three centuries. It cannot
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be regarded as transitory or happenstance.  One
of the novel innovations of the American col-
onies was the absence of a debtors' prison. This
permitted a colonist with debt greater than as-
sets simply to move farther out on the frontier
and start over.  While  this removed  much  of
the risk of business failure, division of the re-
maining assets of a failed business often caused
a great  deal of conflict among creditors.  As a
result, bankruptcy laws were created more than
a century  ago. They provided for the orderly
distribution of assets and the discharge of ex-
cess debt for those with negative equity. More
recently,  a  social  "safety  net"  has  provided
essentials to the destitute. The capitalized val-
ue  of the flow of these  safety net goods  and
services  may  be  regarded  as  the  minimum
wealth any economic agent can realize.
There  are  at  least  four  ways  of modeling
these institutions: a truncated  outcome distri-
bution  with  a  point  mass  at  the  truncation
point,  combined  with  a  continuous  utility
function;  or a segmented utility function hav-
ing the truncation point as the segment change-
point,  combined  with  a  continuous  density
function  for the outcome variable,  where  the
outcome  variable  may  be  either  income  or
wealth.  Robison  and  Lev  and  Robison  and
Barry have shown that by a change of variable,
the income and wealth formulations are equiv-
alent.1All models here are in terms of terminal
wealth.  Therefore,  two  possible  models  re-
main.
The observed fact to be included in the mod-
el is that bankruptcy  protection and the social
safety  net provide  a lower  bound  for a  pro-
prietor's effective  wealth when  large business
losses occur. Let b denote the sum of the equity
one realizes from a bankruptcy proceeding plus
the capitalized value of the safety net. One way
of representing  this  is  to say  that no  matter
how negative  actual equity  may become,  the
effective  wealth  of the  proprietor  is  always
greater than or equal to the lower bound,  b.
This may be represented by a truncated den-
sity function  for terminal wealth with a point
mass at b equal to the probability that an out-
come less than b could occur in the absence of
the bankruptcy  laws and the safety net. Where
0 represents  the  proprietor's  choice  variable
and Wis terminal wealth, let the nontruncated
' Clearly, it is important to use a utility function that is consistent
with the probability density  function. For example,  if a p.d.f.  of
income is used, the risk aversion parameter in the utility function
must reflect  aversion to changes  in income, not wealth.
density be g(w; 0),  -oo  < w < oo. If this prob-
ability density function (p.d.f.) is truncated  at
b  with  a  point  mass  at  b  equal  to  the  area
eliminated by the truncation, the cumulative
distribution  function (c.d.f.)  of the truncated
random variable (Wt)  may be written:
0,  w, < b
(1)  F(w,; 0)  =  g(w; 0)  dw,




Where the utility function of terminal  wealth
is u(w),  -oo  < w  <  oo,  the expected utility of
wealth associated with the discontinuous c.d.f.
may be found with Riemann-Stieltjes  integra-
tion,
E[u(W,; 0)]
-=  j  u(wt) dF(wt; 0)
=  u(b)  g(w; 0)  dw + f u(w)g(w; 0) dw
t-o  b
(2)  = PO(W  < b)u(b) +  f  u(w)g(w;  0)  dw.
The above  approach  is used in Robison  and
Lev and in Robison and Barry. They represent
the relevant institutional  setting with  a trun-
cated p.d.f.  and a continuous  utility function
and state  an objective function  equivalent  to
(2) as equation (9) in Robison and Lev (p. 63)
and equation (14.9) in Robison and Barry (p.
205), but they give no derivation.
The identical objective function may be ob-
tained by assuming that terminal equity may
be negative,2 but utility has a lower bound of
u(b) because  the economic  institutions  miti-
gate  the effect  of  W  <  b.  That  is,  terminal
equity  may be  negative  but the proprietor  is
no  worse  off than  if W =  b.  The  segmented
utility  function  is constant  for wealth  levels
less than or equal to b and increasing and con-
cave for wealth levels greater than b:
*(W)  - ju(b), (  u(w),
w  b
w > b.
2 It is clear that farmers can realize negative equity levels. When
losses exceed equity,  equity becomes  negative.  Because of bank-
ruptcy protection,  however,  farmers  are  no  worse  off than  they
would be if their terminal wealth was b.
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Combining this segmented utility function with
the nontruncated  p.d.f.,  expected utility is:
E[u*(W; 0)]
=  (f  u*(w)g(w; 0) dw
=  f  u(b)g(w; 0) dw +  u(w)g(w; 0) dw
= PO(W < b)u(b) +  u(w)g(w;  6) dw.
Since  the  two  sets  of  assumptions  produce
identical objective  functions,  they are equiv-
alent. Any claim  that one  set of assumptions
represents reality better than the other cannot
be supported by logic.
The second term in (2) may be regarded  as
a conditional expectation of utility. If the por-
tion of the density for  W > b is  divided  by
P( W > b), it integrates to one over the domain
b  <  W  ￿  oc  and may be regarded  as a con-
ditional p.d.f. [g(w; 0 W > b)]. Therefore, the
second term in (2) may be written:
P(W > b)  u(w)g(w;  01 W >  b) dw,
or the probability that terminal wealth will ex-
ceed  the  lower  bound  times  the  conditional
expected utility of terminal wealth given W >
b. By denoting conditional expected utility as
Ec(O) and  regarding Po(W < b)  as the proba-
bility of ruin  [P(0)], it may  be  seen  that the
overall expected utility of terminal wealth for
either  set  of institutional  assumptions  is  in
general:
(3)  E[u(W; 0)]= u(b)P(o) +  [1  - P(O)]Ec(0).
This is simply the weighted average of the util-
ity of the safety-net wealth and the conditional
expected utility where  the probability  of ruin
is the  weighting  factor.  Therefore,  when  the
effects of limited liability are  considered,  ex-
pectation-based  models need not be regarded
as competitors to models of the probability of
ruin for modeling risky  decisions. Real-world
expected utility maximizers should be expect-
ed to base their risky  decisions partly on the
probability of ruin. This may explain the find-
ings of  Masson and others that sometimes safe-
ty-first  models  explain  behavior  better than
expected utility models that do not incorporate
the probability  of ruin.
The first-order condition for the proprietor's
optimal choice of 0 is:
dE[u(W; 0)] dE[u(W;  )] = P'()u(b) - P'(O)Ec(0)
dO
+ E(0)[1  - P(0)]
=  0.
Assuming the sufficient conditions are met and




1 - P(0)  E,(0)-  u(b)'
The  left  side  of (4)  may  be  regarded  as  the
"hazard  rate"  or  "hazard  intensity"  of ruin
(Barlow and Proschan).  The right side  is the
proportional  change  in  the  conditional  ex-
pected utility in excess of the safety-net min-
imum. Although  (4) does not appear to have
an analytic  solution  for common  parametric
distributions  and utility functions,  it may be
applied  in  practice  with  numerical  solution
methods.  The  simplest  way  to  apply  (4)  in
practice  may be to assume some form for the
utility function and use an empirical c.d.f. Oth-
er methods of application are available,  how-
ever, by assuming particular functional  forms
for the utility function and the p.d.f.
Application  of the Robison-Barry Objective
Function where  the Utility of Wealth is
Negative  Exponential
If one  is willing to assume that the utility of
terminal  wealth  is  negative  exponential,  the
Robison-Barry  objective  function  [eq.  (2)  or
(3)]  may  be implemented  with the empirical
moment-generating  function  methodology  of
Collender and Chalfant. Where
u(w) =  1  - e
- lw,
equation (3) becomes,
E[u(W; 0)] = (1  - e-Yb)P(0)  +  [1  - P(0)]
· (l  - e-*w)g(w;  01  W > b) dw
or,  where  Mw(O) = Mw(-y;  0  I W > b) is the
conditional  moment-generating  function  of
terminal wealth given  W > b,
(5) E[u(W; 0)] = u(b)P(0) + [1  - P(0)]
*[1 - Mw(O)].
Therefore, in a practical setting, utility anal-
ysis may be performed by estimating two pa-
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rameters  for  various  values  of the  decision
variable. Assuming b and '  are known, u(b) is
a constant.  Expected utility  for each value of
0 may be  determined by estimating  a proba-
bility  of ruin  and  a point  on the conditional
moment-generating  function.  The  Collender-
Chalfant method makes the estimation of the
point  on the  moment-generating  function
straightforward.  With empirical  distributions,
the estimation of the probability of ruin is also
straightforward.
For those who prefer to use analytical forms
instead of empirical distributions, the negative
exponential  utility  function  may  provide  an
alternative method for applying the Robison-
Barry objective function  [eq.  (2) or (3)] in the
real world. If it is assumed that the utility of
the lower bound for wealth is zero,3 that is,  b
= 0, then u(b) = 0,  and equation (3)  becomes:
E[u(W; 0)]
(6)
(1 - e--w)g(w;  0) dw
=  g(w; 0) dw - e-  ewg(w; 0) dw
= P,(W > b) - L(g;  y, 0),
where  L(g;  y, 0) is  the  Laplace  transform  of
the portion of the p.d.f. where  w > b.  There
are hundreds of analytic solutions of Laplace
transforms  for  different  forms  of g(w)  (see
Roberts  and  Kaufman).  While  we could  not
find solutions  for common  parametric  forms
of probability distributions, a solution may ex-
ist for a form of g(w) that is a reasonable  ap-
proximation of a real-world  density function
of  terminal wealth. If it could be found, it would
provide an analytic solution for the second term
of (6).  Otherwise,  the integral  may be evalu-
ated numerically.
Application of the Robison-Barry
Objective Function where  Utility is
Negative  Exponential  and the
Distribution of Terminal Wealth is
Normal
Where terminal wealth is normally distributed
and  the  utility  function  is negative  exponen-
tial, the Robison-Barry objective function  [eq.
3  In reality,  b would have a small positive value so that using b
=  0 is an approximation.
(2)  or  (3)]  contains  both the Roy  safety-first
criterion  and  the Freund  mean-variance  cri-
terion as special cases. When the mean and the
variance of the normal p.d.f. of terminal wealth
are functions of the proprietor's decision vari-
able, 0, the p.d.f. is:
g(w; 0)  =  (2i7r2)-  'exp[-(w  - )2/(2 02)],
-oo  <  w  <  oo,  j  = ~(0),  a  =  ff().
Assuming negative  exponential  utility, equa-
tion (3)  becomes:
E[u(W; 0)]





= PO(W < b)u(b) + Po(W > b)
- exp(-yw)(2io-)-/ 2
b
*exp[-(w - ,)2/(2  2)]  dw.
By combining the exponents in the third term
and completing the square,
E[u(W; 0)]  = P,(W < b)u(b) + Po(W > b)
- exp[--y(t  - 7a2/2)]
·P,(W > b+  -r2)
(7)  = 1 - PO(W - b)exp(--yb)
- exp[-7y(t  - ya2 /2)]
·- P(W > b  + 7(a2).
The Robison-Barry  objective function  for a
normal p.d.f. and negative exponential utility,
(7),  contains  many familiar terms from  stan-
dard risk analysis. The term P( W < b) is Roy's
safety-first criterion for a "disaster"  level of b
which is minimized by maximizing  (i  - b)/a
as a function of 0. The term exp[-7y(,  - y-2/
2)]  is Freund's mean-variance criterion which
is minimized  by maximizing A - yo-2/2.  The
final term is a safety-first criterion for a disaster
level of b +  yr 2 or the minimum wealth level
plus  twice  the  risk premium  from  standard
mean-variance  analysis. It has long been rec-
ognized  that  we  define  risk  in three  distinct
ways:  the probability  of a disaster,  the vari-
ability  of terminal  wealth,  and  the risk pre-
mium required to induce a decision maker to
accept a gamble. The Robison-Barry objective
function,  (7), makes expected utility a function
of all three risk concepts.
The  Robison-Barry  objective function,  (7),
approaches the Roy safety-first criterion or the
Freund mean-variance criterion as the param-
eters take  on values in certain ranges.  This is
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demonstrated  best  by  a  numerical  example.
The  size  of the risk aversion  parameter  and
the  magnitude  of the  mean  terminal  wealth
relative to its standard deviation determine the
form of the model.  Suppose that the capital-
ized value of safety-net goods plus the amount
of  equity  from  a  bankruptcy  proceeding  is
$10,000. This means b = 10,000. Further, sup-
pose three farmers operate identical farms with
expected  income  of $40,000  and  a  standard
deviation of $25,000.  However, they have dif-
ferent  levels  of initial  wealth  and,  therefore,
differing amounts of financial leverage, as well
as different risk aversion parameters.
Farmer A has paid  for the farm,  has a be-
ginning wealth level of $500,000,  and  a risk
aversion  parameter  of  y = .0001.  Since  ter-
minal wealth  is initial  wealth plus income,  a
random  income  that  is N(1. = $40,000;  a =
$25,000)  means  that  the  p.d.f.  of  terminal
wealth is N(u = $540,000; a =  $25,000).  This
set of parameters  establishes  clear values  for
some of the terms in (7).  The term Po(W < b)
is the probability that a N(t = $540,000;  a  =
$25,000) random variable will realize a value
less than $10,000 or the probability that a val-
ue  will  be realized  that is  21.2  standard  de-
viations  less than the mean.  Although  this is
a positive number,  it is clearly  small  enough
to ignore. The term P(W > b +  y- 2) = Po(W
>  $72,500),  or the probability  that a normal
random variable will be greater than 18.7 stan-
dard deviations below the mean, is essentially
one.  Therefore,  for  these  parameter  values,
equation (7)  becomes:
E[u(W)]
1 - 0 exp(--yb)  - exp[-7y(t  - ya2/2)]1
1 - exp[-y(,  - ya2/2)].
This  is  the  Freund  mean-variance  criterion
which is maximized by maximizing  ,u - ya2/
2.  Therefore,  when  farmer  A  is  considering
marginal changes in expected income and the
standard  deviation of income,  the  Robison-
Barry  objective  function,  (7),  becomes  the
Freund  objective function.  By making initial
wealth large relative to the standard deviation
of income and making  y small, the two objec-
tive  functions  can  be  made arbitrarily  close.
For practical purposes, if initial wealth is large
enough that expected terminal wealth less the
value of b is more than three times the stan-
dard  deviation  of wealth  for  all  risk-return
choices,  P(W < b) is probably  small  enough
to ignore. If, in addition,  y < (,t  - b - 3a)/f 2
for all ,,  a choices,  then P(W >  b  +  yo-
2) is
essentially one, and mean-variance  should be
a  reasonably  accurate  approximation  to  ex-
pected utility.
Farmer B, however,  has a small amount of
equity and is more risk averse. Suppose farmer
B  has  an initial  wealth  of $15,000  and  y  =
.001.  In this  case,  terminal  wealth  is  N((u  =
$55,000; a = $25,000). The last term in equa-
tion (7) is P,(W > b + ,y 2) = P(W> $635,000).
The probability that a normal random variable
will  be  more  than  23.2  standard  deviations
above the mean is essentially zero. Therefore,
in this case,  equation (7) becomes
E[u(W)] x  1 - P,(W  < b)e-yb
Since e-~b is a constant, expected utility is max-
imized  by minimizing  Po(W <  b),  which  is
Roy's criterion for a disaster level of b. There-
fore, max[(0  - b)/o] maximizes expected util-
ity for farmer B when marginal changes in the
mean  and  standard  deviation  of income  are
considered. The safety-first criterion should be
a good approximation to expected utility if the
risk aversion parameter is large relative to mean
wealth for all relevant risk-return choices. This
should occur when  y > (u  - b  + 3a)/ao2.
Farmer C has the small equity of farmer B
($15,000) but the smaller risk aversion param-
eter of farmer A (y = .0001). In this case,  ter-
minal  wealth  has  the  same  distribution  as
farmer  B, namely,  W - N(Au  = $55,000;  o- =
$25,000). Since the risk aversion parameter is
smaller,  however, both Po(W  < b) and Po(W
> b  +  ya-2) are  affected  by marginal changes
in the mean and standard deviation of income.
The probability of a disaster has a z-value  of
1.8, and  the probability that terminal wealth
will exceed the lower bound plus twice the risk
premium has a z-value of.7. Since incremental
changes in expected income  and the standard
deviation of income will change both of these
probabilities,  the Roy and the Freund criteria
will  both  fail  to  be  good approximations  to
expected  utility,  and  the  full Robison-Barry
equation,  (7),  must be used to predict behav-
ior. This may be easily accomplished with sim-
ple numerical methods.
It is clear that the Robison-Barry  objective
function  [eqs.  (2), (3),  (5),  (6),  or  (7)]  should
predict behavior better than either the safety-
first or the mean-variance criterion in the real
world because limited liability is an observed
fact.  However,  in this model  the parameters
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y, tu,  and  a  do  not have  their  conventional
economic interpretation.  The  y parameter re-
lates to risk attitudes but may not reflect the
coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The choice
problem  is  still  to  choose At  and  a from  the
choice set, but they may not be "return"  and
"risk."  The  proper  interpretation  of the pa-
rameters depends on which set of assumptions
is used to specify the model.
If the segmented exponential utility function
is used with a nontruncated  normal distribu-
tion, the A and a parameters  reasonably  may
be used to represent  "return" and "risk,"  but
y  may not be called the coefficient of absolute
risk aversion.  In fact, the utility function does
not exhibit risk-averse behavior over the lower
section  of its domain because  it  is  constant.
The  segmented  utility function  exhibits  risk-
seeking behavior for low levels of wealth and
risk aversion at high levels of wealth. If a stan-
dard exponential utility function is combined
with  a  truncated  normal  distribution,  the  y
may  be  called  a  coefficient  of  absolute  risk
aversion,  but gt and a may not be regarded as
"return" and "risk." The expectation  and the
variance of the truncated distribution are both
functions of t,  a, and the truncation  point,  b.
When  W ~ N(g1,  a2),  Wt is truncated normal
with  a point mass at b with a c.d.f.  given by
(1).  The expectation  (it)  and the variance  (a2)
of  the truncated distribution may be found with
Riemann-Stieltjes  integration.  The mean is:
A=t  w,  dF(w,)
=  ar([b - g]/a) + 1A(-[b - ]/a),
where  0 indicates  the standard  normal p.d.f.
and · indicates the standard normal c.d.f. The
variance  of the truncated distribution is
2 =  (w,  - t)
2 dF(w,)
=  a-2(1  - b-  pl/a)) - bao([b  - u]/a))
- (ut - u)  + b(b-  2pt)I([b - ]/a).
Therefore,  while it makes  sense to frame  the
problem in terms of I and a, they may not be
interpreted as "return" and "risk" for the model
with a  truncated  distribution  since both the
mean and variance  of the truncated  distribu-
tion are functions of J and a.
Conclusion
The Robison-Barry objective function  for ex-
pected utility maximization  under conditions
of limited liability has potential for predicting
behavior  under uncertainty  more  accurately
than  conventional  models  since it  considers
the effects  of these important  economic insti-
tutions. Empirical application of the model in
its  most  general  form  requires  numerical
methods, but some conventional methods may
be used if one is willing to make assumptions
about  functional  forms.  When  the  utility  of
wealth is negative  exponential,  the empirical
method  of Yassour,  Zilberman, and  Rausser
as  extended  by Collender  and  Chalfant may
be  used to  implement  the model in  the real
world for any p.d.f.  of wealth that has a mo-
ment-generating  function.  The Laplace trans-
form also provides  the possibility of an ana-
lytic  solution  when  utility  is  negative
exponential.  When the utility of wealth is neg-
ative exponential  and the distribution of ter-
minal wealth is normal, the Robison-Barry ob-
jective  function  contains  the Roy  safety-first
criterion  and  the Freund  mean-variance  cri-
terion as special cases for certain values of the
parameters.  However, for other sets of param-
eter values,  neither  of the standard  methods
provides  a  good  approximation  to  expected
utility for proprietors with limited liability. In
these  situations,  the standard models  will fail
and the Robison-Barry objective function must
be used.
[Received May 1990; final revision
received January 1991.]
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